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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the District 
court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which found 
him guilty by a jury trial of violation of Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On Aprll 14 and 15, 1976, appellant was tried and 
convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302, 
Ctah Code Annotated as a~ended in 1975. He was sentenced to the 
Ctah State Prison for an indeterminate ter~ of five years to life 
in prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant petitions the court to hold Section 76-6-302, 
Ctah Code Annotated as amended in 1975, unconstitutional as 
applied to this plaintiff and to vacate and reverse the District 
Court judg~ent or, in the alternative, to declare a mistrial and 
remand the case for further proceedings or, in the alternative, 
to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
robbery under Section 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 22nd day of July, l97S, Jcrr~ Grah~c was 
at Dan's Foodtown at 70th South and H1qhlano In-l"'· 
County, State of Utah. 0 n J u l y 2 2 I 1 9 7 s , a r j I' t l l r:l r' t .... 3. s d ~ ~: 
in connection with the robbery, ident1fiu1 u· ~-~~ 
assailant and on July 23, 1975, a comf-!lalnt ·.>as '1l•·ci acccs_-
/ the appellant of aggravated robber·/ in ':iolati·r-:·:--. ~:- :=:-::·cl:_ir:.~ 
76-6-302, Utah Code .'\nnotates ~953 as af"'err]r·: ,. 
by jury was held on Apr1l 14 and 15, l9~G. 
to the jury: 
"I~struct1on ~o. 8: 
i:lte:J":l::;~al -:J.klr.,· c:f ~crso:--.al 
DOSSESS:2:~ 3.~0t~C~ :ro:r ~13 
_-: .. : t t r 
,..,.- (_. 3 ...... 5 
A person cor."--r.1ts an a :era" 'it·: _ ,J 
is a first je::-:ree :cl~:.·.:, i:, _._ ~:-.>: ~~~~sc ::: 
conunitt1ng a r,::Dber·.:, t:-:a~ ~'er-s::-~. :::~--:.:: 3 ;.,::::.:::~·: 
weapon. 
the manner o~ 1ts ~sc 2~ _c .• 
to cause L-:ea:::•~ .,,.- St-r:c,~s : ~--:1 
Under ":.::t- 13· .. ;, .1 ..... 3 =--=-
robbery,' 3.5 t:--1a ~ ~~.r 3St' 
tlons, 1 f 
atte::1pt tc 
robber;·. 
perso:13l ~ro::cr:·.· 
used l:-'. t:~cs­
F ro~e l- t y •,,· _:_· ~ ;; 
a!lc: ·.,·l ~ . .-.. .._ ~- ·=-
... _1 : .J.'. ·,.;.:-~::" 
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Under the law, one acts intentionally or 
with intent with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or as a result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or to cause the result. 
Intent with which an act is done denotes a 
state of mind and connotes purpose in so acting. 
Intent, being a state of mind, is not always 
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence 
and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
"Instruction No. 9: You are instructed that 
a firearm is not a deadly weapon unless it is loaded. 
The Utah Code defines when a weapon is deemed to have 
been loaded in 76-10-502, but if from the evidence 
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 
gun testified to in this case was loaded, you must 
find the defendant not guilty of aggravated robbery 
and consider the lesser included offense of robbery." 
"Instruction No. 10: You are instructed that 
for the purposes of this case, that a "dangerous 
weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use 
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily inJury. In construing whether an item, object 
or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is 
a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument, 
object or thing; the character of the wound produced, 
if any; and the manner in which the instrument, 
obJect, or thing was used shall be determinative. 
'Firearms' means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off 
rifle and/or any device that could be used as a 
weapon from which is expelled a projective by any 
force." 
"Instruction No. 11: You are instructed that 
facsimile is defined as: An exact and precise copy 
of anything. An exact reproduction, for example, the 
signature reproduced by rubber stamp." 
"Instruction No. 12: You are further instructed 
that a facsimile of a firearm is any instrument that 
by 1ts appearance resembles a firearm." 
-3-
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' 
"Instruction No. 13: Before yo'J can convict 
the defendant of the crime of aggravated robbery, 
as charged in the Information, you must find fror 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 22nd day of cTuly, 1?::, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
Steven Craig Turner, unlawfully and intentionallv 
took money or property from cTerry Graham. · 
2. That said property or money was 1n the 
possession or immediate presence of cTerrj' (;raham. 
3. That the taking of sa1d mone1· or proper( 
from Jerry Graham was accomplished by means of 
force or fear. 
I 
4. That in the course of taking said m0m·~· Gc , 
property the defendant, Steven Craig Turner, use::' 
deadly weapon consisting of a firearm or a facsl~ll' 
of a f1rearm 
~f ·:ou believe that the evidence establishes 
eacn a:-,._, ::c:l of the essential elements of the o~fe'·" 
bejc~~ ~ ,·,:,c.s·:>nable doubt, it is your dutj' to con•:1:: 
the .c.~.t. On the other hand, if thE' e•.'idence ·, 
failed to so establish one or morE' of sa1d elements 
then you should find the defendant not guilty o~ 
aggravated robbery and then consider the lesser 
included offense of robbery in accordance w1th tc,~ 
following instruction." 
Closing arguments were then heard an·l U1e Jur:· 
began its deliberations. After the JUrJ had lefl the c:Jurtro:· 
time was granted by the bench tG except to the 1nstructions. 
The State indicated it had no obJections. ,.\1-'f.wllivil oh]ects~ 
to the above recited instructions (T.l2J-4) tf;i' \1 r()un:~s rl ?' 
the instructions were confusing and confl1ct1rr•; "' : cJrt,,er 
objected to the statute as be1nq unconslil•Jtu·Jrc~ll· ·1 uc•. 
-4-
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POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
SECTIOtJ 76-6-302 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AHENDED IN 
1975, IS VOID BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO 
APPELLANT IN THIS CASE. 
Section 76-6-302 insofar as it is pertinent to this 
case reads as follows: 
"(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a fire-
arm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; 
The complaint under which appellant was charged reads: 
"That the said Steven Craig Turner, at the time and 
place aforesaid, robbed Jerry Graham, and in so doing, 
used a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun or facsimile 
thereof;" (R.B) 
The complaint charged defendant with using a gun or facsimile 
thereof and that it was a deadly weapon. Although the complaint 
reads ln accordance with the statute, the difficulty in this case 
arose when the court attempted to interpret the word "facsimile". 
The term "facsimile" has been defined in a very few 
dissertations on the law, but it does appear at least twice as 
~ollows: 
"Ft\CSIMILE. An exact copy, preserving all the 
marks of the original." (Blacks Law Dictionary; 
35 C.J.S.) 
The common meaning of the word as given in l~ebsters 
~ew UnabriJgeJ Dictionary, Second Addition, is the same: 
-s-
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as of 
Syn. 
"1. Act of making a copy, imitation. 
2. An exact and detailed copy of anythina, 
a book, document, painting, or statute;" 
See duplicate. (emphasis added) 
Appellant 1 s research has produced no case lav1 thac 
defines the term. One case has defined the word "imitation' 
"The word 1 imitation 1 when applied to pistols and 
revolvers means so nearly resembling the genuine 
as to mislead." People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S. 2: 
350 at 356; 1 Mise 2d 821 (1955) (Emphasls added) 
From the above, it is clear then that the term 
"facsimile" means "an exact copy" whether one examines the'" 
meaning or the legal meaning and that even an lr'li tat ion mea:' 
same. In People v. Delgarda, supra, the court went on to J" 
examples of cap guns and water pistols. Clearly the evidenc' 
in this case does --:ct e•:en approach the meanir,g of these "·cr:: 
Mr. Graham tes-:.'.···: :n'1t he saw an inch to an inch and aha: 
of a hollow tube: (T. 10 and T.22) 
"Q. Now, you indicated you saw about arJ inc 
and a half of a gun pointing out of a sh1rt, is t:." 
what you stated? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Would you expla1n to me ·~·hat ''OU mean 
pointing out of hlS shirt? 
A He had his hand under the bar1·el, ,_.,ras jus~ 
up under his shirt. All I could se0 of t''- shir' .!C-
down over lt was an inch ar1d a hal~ of the barreJl. 
Q. Did the barrel have a s1oht o!17 
A No, JUSt a rounc, short--
-6-
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"Q. Sure it wasn't a piece of pipe? 
A. I don't believe it to be, no. 
Q. Very polished? Well, how did he have his 
hand in his shirt with the gun poking out? 
A. He just had it under his shirt with his 
gun stuck under coming out here. (Indicating.) 
And he was toward me this way so I couldn't see 
how he had his hand. 
Q. Was his shirt tucked in? 
A. Yes. It was. 
Q. Well, all you saw was something shiny and 
round without a sight on it, is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You're sure you didn't give the police 
any further description of what you've told us 
here today? 
A. No. Not that I recall at this time, no." 
In its jury instructions the court expanded the meaning 
of the term "f ac simile" well beyong its proper meaning. 
Instruction #12 reads: 
"You are further instructed that a facsimile 
of a f1rearm is any instrument that by its 
appearance resembles a firearm." 
When Instruction 12 is read with Instruction 11, which requires 
that a facsimile be an "exact and precise copy", it is clear that 
Instruction 12 opens the door to a vast area of riefinition and 
lnterpretation. In effect, Instruction 12 cancels and eliminates 
the need for Instruction 11 and the jury might be persuaded by 
something other than an exact duplicate. 
-7-
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When Instruction 12 is read together with Instruc::j 
the vagueness is even more pronounced. In Instruction 9 th; I 
I 
instructs the jury that they must find that the gun was loac,
1 
while in Instruction 12, the object need not even be a gun ;:I 
I 
no instruction indicates that the facsimile need be dangero'.' 1 
I 
I deadly, but need only resemble, in some unknown way, a gun. : 
Clearly, the instructions have so distorted the meaning o!t 
words of the statute that they have no meaning whatsoever. 
applied in this case, the statute is vague and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The statute must give fair notice of what is proh:j 
People v. Barksdale, 105 Cal. Rptr 1, 8C3d 320, 503 P.2d 2:' 
(1972); People v. Carcia, 541 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1975); Peopl:_ 
Gonzales, 534 P.2d 626 (Colo. 1975); State v. Kimball,~ 
503 P.2d 1~6 119~21 · Hildahl v. State, 536 P.2d 1298 (Okl. £j 
~·c,te, 536 P.2d 373 (Okl. Cr. Ct. l975l:S 
Martinez, 85 Wash. 2d 671, 538 P.2d 521 (1975); Blondheim 1·.j 
-----
84 Wash. 2d 874; 529 P.2d 1096 (1975); State v. Packard, ~ 2 :J 
369; 250 P.2d 561. The instructions in this case lea\'e absc:l 
no standard as to the meaning of the word facs1mile. The ob:: 
could have been a three-inch piece of rubber tubing painted ::I 
gray plastic tubing or any number of things that arE' neither 
I 
or dangerous and still appellant could have been conv1ctPd r: 
I 
vated robbery. Furthermore, under the jury 1 nstruct ions in ·I 
case the entire object need not resemble d 'Jiln. :~r. Graham 
-8-
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saw one inch of the object and that inch only looked like par~ 
of a gun, yet appellant was convicted. 
Appellant submits that the District Court's instruc-
tions so changed the meaning of the statute as to leave it vague 
and uncertain, and therefore unconstitutional, as applied to 
appellant. 
POINT II 
THE I~STRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT COURT ARE 
CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY. 
1. Instruction number 8 defines a deadly weapon in 
the followina manner: 
"A :leadly weapon means anything that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is likely 
to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
(ef'lphasis added) 
Instruction 8 requires the jury to find that a deadly 
weapon, as def1ned in the instruction, was used by appellant. It 
will be observed that the instruction defines a deadly weapon in 
terms of the 2robability of its causing death. 
weapons: 
The court then gives Instruction 10 on dangerous 
.. a 'dangerous weapon' means any item that in the 
manner of its use or intended use is capable of 
causing death or serious bodily injury. 
Although Instruction 10 is appellant's instruction, appellant 
submits that the two instructions together are conflicting, 
contrad1ctory and confusing. 
HCJ\'tnq the capacity to kill is a more expansive defi-
nition than havtna the likelihood of killing. In no instruction 
-9-
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does the court explain the difference in the two terms, ~~ 
after appellant's objection that the two instructions were 
contradictory. It is entirely possible for the jury to have 
found appellant guilty on the more comprehensive definitioo 
than on the meaning of the term "deadly weapon", the term 
appeallant was charged with. It was possible for the jury t: 
have been confused with both terms and assumed them to ha~ 
been the same. Taken together, the two definitions are~~ 
fusing and erroneous. State v. Hendricks, l2_~-~t__:__~_2, 
258 P.2d 452 (1951); State v. Wheeler, 70 Id. ~~1._~- P.2d 
687 (1948). 
2. Instruction 8 requires the appellant to ha\'e 
~deadly weapon. Instruction 9 requires that if the object 
used was a gun ~~at :t ~ad to be loaded before it could ~ 
classified as :, ..:•2.lJlj· weapon and that if the gun was not 
I 
loaded the jury could not find appellant guilty of aggravate: 
robbery. Instruction 10 then defines a dangerous weapon. 
Without an explanation as to the reason for the use of the 
definition the jury could then believe that this third defi·: 
nition would also suffice to convict. Instruction 12 then 
I 
defines facsimile 1.n broad terms and does not require that'' 
! 
facsimile be loaded, dangerous or deadly, nor does it requll 
that the facsimile be likely or capable of causing death. t 
rc•J.l·"rate an' essence then, the jury now has a fourth reason, ~ -' 
distinct from the first three, to convict. Fin all\', 
-10-
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Instruction 13 is given which leaves the impression that a gun 
or facsimile of a gun is per se a deadly weapon. The instruc-
tions, therefore, have left the jury with at least five 
possible methods of convicting, all contradictory, and appel-
lant is the recipient of the effects. State v. Hendricks, 
supra; State v. Wheeler, supra. 
3. It should be pointed out that the complaint charged 
appellant with use of a deadly weapon and that the deadly 
weapon was a gun or facsimile of a gun. The instructions, 
however, expand the complaint to include the ones other than 
a deadly gun. It is contrary to law to expand the theory of 
law beyond the limits of the complaint in the instructions. 
State v. Anderson, 100 Ut. 468, 116 P.2d 398. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 76-6-302 as applied in this case is unconsti-
tutional. The instructions given to the jury were contra-
dietary, confusing and over-expansive and, therefore, erroneous 
and contrary to law. Appellant, therefore, submits that this 
court should reverse the lower court's decision or, in the 
alternative, find the defendant guilty of the lesser included 
offense of robbery under Section 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated 
19 53. 
Respectfully submit~ed., 
•, SUMNER J .. 'HATCH 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
-11-
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Mailed two cop1es o:' the fore·~oinq lJri<e~ to t·1r. 
Mr. Robert B. Hanser,, ,\ttornc~· General of ·.· 1>J~,, :: j~ State 
Capitol, Salt Lake C1l'/, 1~'tar. 84114, jJC.~stuc:c r.:· ,·d~, ':".ls 
17th day of Febrllary, 1 'J 71. 
/ 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
- j. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
